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Abstract
This paper looks at the applicability of formal, informal, liberal and corporate
consociationalism to Iraq. It examines the drafting of the Iraqi constitution in 2005
and the political system it consecrated. It argues that the political system in Iraq is a
good example of informal consociationalism, with government formation governed
by unwritten consociational rules and norms. It then examines the negative
problems connected with this system, primarily exclusion and systematically
sanctioned corruption. It concludes by examining the challenges posed to the
post‐2005 system by the mass protest movement that started in October 2019.
Introduction
The Iraqi constitution of 2005 and the political system it consecrated has become
a key case study and debating point in the literature focused on peacebuilding in
post‐conflict or deeply divided societies. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary
herald the constitution – which O’Leary was involved in drafting – as a key
example of liberal consociationalism (McGarry and O’Leary 2007). Matthijs
Bogaards, by contrast, traces Iraq’s current political problems back to what he
terms the constitution’s ‘light’ consociationalism, focused on temporary
power‐sharing measures and ‘fluid federalism’ (Bogaards 2019b:2). Still others
emphasize the exclusionary, secretive and rushed manner in which the
document was written and the flaws this has created (Aboultaif 2020;
Anderson 2015; Arato 2009; Hay 2014; Horowitz 2008; McEvoy and
Morrow 2005). These criticisms are all well founded. However, over and above
this, the ethno‐sectarian proportional distribution of jobs and state resources and
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the ideational ‘groupist’ assumption underpinning the constitution, although
central to consociationalism, have directly contributed to the violent instability
of the political system post‐regime change and the de‐legitimization of the elite
that runs it (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).
What Form of Consociationalism Does Iraq Have?
To a remarkable extent, contemporary consociational approaches, whether
academic analysis or normative prescription, follow the approach outlined in
Arend Lijphart’s early work (Lijphart 1969, 1977). Although Lijphart later
stressed that his four pillars for consociational democracy were not meant to be
rigid rules, his promotion of inclusive grand governing coalitions, a mutual veto
on policy, segmental autonomy, and proportionality in both political
representation and the distribution of state resources, are reproduced throughout
the majority of work that claims to be consociational (Lijphart 1977:25, 33, 36–
7; 2001:11; O’Leary 2001:42; Taylor 2009:9).
In an attempt to respond to criticisms that the consociational agenda was based
upon a primordial conception of political identity (Dixon 2011), which he himself
acknowledged, Lijphart later introduced the distinction between ‘pre‐determined
and self‐determined groups in power‐sharing systems’ (Lijphart 2001:11). This
was reworked by later generations of consociationalists, including Allison
McCulloch and Joanne McEvoy in this special feature (McCulloch and
McEvoy 2020), as a contrast between corporate and liberal consociation, with
the latter involving the recognition and political integration of whatever groups
emerge in a given polity at a given time (Lijphart 2001; McCulloch 2014:503–
4, 509; McGarry and O’Leary 2007:675; O’Driscoll 2017:317). A final
distinction which has been added to Lijphart’s work, and which is especially
useful in analysing Iraq, is between formal and informal consociationalism:
those consociational power‐sharing agreements that are enshrined in law or
within a constitution, and those that have been reached through private
negotiations or have evolved to become unwritten norms or practices.
Iraq’s claim to being consociational rests mainly on the political system
brought to life by two national elections, the drafting of a new constitution, and
its ratification by national referendum, all in 2005. The constitution itself and
the process involved in drafting it are certainly controversial (Anderson 2015).
The elections of January 2005 were for a National Assembly, which was to
write the new constitution by August and have it ratified by referendum in
October. This seven‐month timetable was very short when compared to the
drafting of other post‐conflict constitutions (Al‐Ali 2014:86–7). Iraq’s truncated
drafting period was further reduced by the slow process of post‐election
government formation. The head of the National Assembly’s Constitutional
Committee, Humam Hamoudi, was not appointed until 23 May, ahead of a 15
August deadline for the constitution to be drafted.
The role of both the Assembly and the Committee were then effectively
scrapped on 8 August when the work of finishing the draft was taken over by a
‘Leadership Council’ (Morrow 2005:9; see also Arato 2009). This group was
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comprised of Jalal Talabani (President of Iraq and leader of one of the two main
Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK]), Masoud Barzani
(President of the Kurdish Regional Government and leader of the other main
Kurdish party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP]), Abdul Aziz al‐Hakim
(leader of one of the three main Shi‘a Islamist groups, the Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI]), and Ibrahim al‐Jaafari (leader of
another Shi‘a Islamist party, Dawa). Given the important role played by mutual
veto and inclusive ruling coalitions in Lijphart’s model of consociationalism, it
is significant that those claiming to represent the Sunni section of society as
well as those who mobilized secular and Iraqi nationalist votes were deliberately
excluded from the Leadership Council.
This exclusion meant that the Iraqi constitution was drafted by the two
dominant Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, and by SCIRI (Anderson 2015;
Younis 2011). These three groups were united by a joint commitment to a
highly federal decentralized Iraqi state. The other major Shi‘a Islamist groups,
the Dawa Party (then led by Ibrahim al‐Jaafari) and Muqtada al‐Sadr’s
movement, both actively opposed the federal aspects of the constitution – one
from inside the process, one from outside – both to no avail
(Hamoudi 2014:65). By writing the constitution to such a tight schedule,
without any attempt at consultation and by actively excluding two of the three
major Shi‘a parties and those representing Sunnis as well as secular nationalists,
the constitution became a lightning rod for those who felt alienated from the
post‐2003 political order and undoubtedly it became one of the main reasons
for an escalation in the civil war (Dodge 2012:44–9; O’Driscoll 2017).
Beyond the flawed process of its drafting, Bogaards has argued that the
constitution also contributed to Iraq’s violent instability because it incorporated
few or no power‐sharing mechanisms. He argues that the weak, liberal,
voluntary and informal power‐sharing in the constitution failed to deliver ‘a
stable framework for the accommodation of communal tensions’
(Bogaards 2019b:2). This argument echoes Donald Horowitz’s critique that
‘Apart from enshrining values of federalism […] it is difficult to identify in that
document any institutions designed to reduce ethnic or sectarian conflict’
(Horowitz 2008:1230). However, in a different paper examining Lebanon’s
political system, Bogaards successfully develops the distinction between formal
and informal consociationalism, arguing that the majority of rules that govern
Lebanon’s corporate consociationalism are informal (Bogaards 2019a:33, 35).
Iraq’s consociational system functions in a comparably informal norm‐based way.
Bogaards is right to argue that the formal consociational rules in Iraq’s
constitution are minimal, with a number of them lapsing after a specified period
of time. However, an examination of how government formation has functioned
following each of Iraq’s five national elections between 2005 and 2018
indicates that a consistent and inflexible set of informal rules has imposed a
consociational logic on the system. After voting has finished and the tally is
officially agreed, Article 55 of the constitution specifies that negotiations to
appoint a government must begin with the selection of a Speaker for the
Council of Representatives (Constitution of Iraq 2005). The informal
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consociational rules stipulate that this has to be a Sunni. Negotiations then move
on to the appointment of a President, formally regulated by Articles 70 and 72 of
the constitution. Informally, the rule is that the President has to come from one of
the two main Kurdish parties. Under Article 76 of the constitution, the President is
tasked with selecting a representative from the largest bloc in parliament to
become Prime Minister designate, who then forms the government. The
informal rules of the system stipulate that the Prime Minister has to be a Shi‘a.
Each Prime Minister since 2005 has then appointed a Grand Coalition cabinet,
comprised of those parties that claim to represent Iraq’s various ethnic and
religious communities and which had a degree of success at the ballot box.
Hence, while the formal rules regulating this consociational system are indeed
limited, the power of the informal norms, first applied in 2005, is such that this
consociational process has regulated the formation of every government of
national unity since then.
The Weakness of Iraq’s Informal Consociational System
Iraq’s political system has been undermined by two major weaknesses, however,
both of which can be traced back to faults in Lijphart’s original conception of
consociationalism. The first is linked to his notion of proportionality, ‘a method
of allocating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources in the
form of government subsidies among the different segments’
(Lijphart 1977:38). In the process of government formation in Iraq after each
national election, it is not only ministerial posts that are allocated to the
victorious parties who claim to represent Iraq’s ethnic and religious
communities but also the right to appoint senior civil servants across
government, as well as the ‘private grades’ comprising the Director Generals
that run each ministry (Dodge 2019). Interviews carried out by the author in
Baghdad indicate that in the aftermath of the 2018 election, for example, in
addition to ministerial posts, the awarding of approximately 800 senior civil
service jobs, spread across all ministries, was a central part of the government
formation negotiations.
This proportionality at the core of informal consociationalism has given rise to
systematically sanctioned corruption. Hence the function of the party‐appointed
civil servants, whilst overseeing government contracting in each ministry, is to
siphon off illicit resources to fund the parties’ operating budgets, fuelling
personal corruption as well. Judge Radhi Hamza al‐Radhi, the Head of the
Commission on Public Integrity from 2004 to 2006, damned the government’s
contracting process as ‘the father of all corruption issues’ (Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction 2011:8). Investigative journalists have exposed
numerous cases of contract fraud involving ministers, foreign firms and either
bogus agreements or bribes paid for preferential treatment in government
bidding rounds (Saqr 2019). In confidential interviews carried out in Iraq by the
author, senior government ministers suggested that as much as 25% of their
annual budget was misappropriated through contract fraud.
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The second dynamic within Iraqi politics that places doubt on Lijphart’s
approach and consociational power‐sharing more generally surrounds the issue
of dominant identities. Although Lijphart disavowed an earlier commitment to
primordialism, consociational scholars have little to say about where identities
come from, how sub‐state communities are solidified and can change, or the
validity of the national elite’s claims to represent their constituencies
(Anderson 2015; McEvoy and Aboultaif 2020). Inflexible ‘segmental cleavages’
remained central to Lijphart’s work (Lijphart 1977:48). John McGarry and
Brendan O’Leary also argued that identities can be ‘inflexible, resilient,
crystallized, durable, and hard’, without saying why or how they became hard
or how they could change. (McGarry and O’Leary 2007:671; 2009:17). As Paul
Dixon (2020) argues in his contribution to this collection, this opens scholars
who do not examine the process of identity formation and identity change but
instead take those identities as given to the charge that their work is based on
an assumption – whether passive or active, conscious or subconscious – of
primordialism (Chandra 2001:8; Dixon 2011).
To avoid this charge, those working within consociationalism have to engage
critically with comparative theories of political identity and the causalities
behind identity change. To move away from the charge of primordialism, it is
not enough simply to point to historical or contemporary examples of hard,
inflexible or resilient identities as a justification for consociationalism. An
extended engagement with both the empirical history and contemporary politics
of where those identities originated and what agential and structural conditions
have kept them coherent and at the heart of political and sociological
interactions is needed. In addition, this has to be coupled with an overt
engagement with contemporary social theory focused on examining identity
politics. This is necessary to explain – from within comparative politics – why
some identities are constantly reinvented and renegotiated to remain relevant
while others fade into political and rhetorical obscurity (see for example
Dodge 2018, 2020).
It is the failure of Iraq’s consociational system that has driven a major
transformation in Iraqi identities and political mobilization. Popular
dissatisfaction with the political system is indicated by a steady decline in
turnout at national elections, from a peak of 70% in December 2005 to 44%
nationally in 2018, 33% in Baghdad and only 10% percent in Basra
(Mansour 2018). More importantly, this widespread disillusionment with Iraq’s
ethno‐sectarian consociational political system has given rise to an increasingly
coherent protest movement that has seen over a million people repeatedly come
onto the streets of Baghdad and Iraq’s southern cities from October
2019 onwards.
This movement represents the high point of protests that started in 2009, and it
has developed a powerful critique of Iraq’s consociational system and the
widespread corruption the protestors associate with it. It has also developed an
alternative ideological platform based on a secular unitary Iraqi nationalism that
demands equal rights and representation for all Iraqis, irrespective of their
ethno‐sectarian background (Dodge and Mansour 2020). The response of the
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ruling elite empowered by the post‐2005 consociational system has been to
deploy increasing levels of deadly violence in an attempt to defend their right to
rule and the benefits that come with it in the face of the failure of their
ethno‐sectarian rhetoric.
Conclusion
Iraqi politics post‐2003 has clearly been shaped by a coherent and sustained
consociational bargain struck by the country’s ruling elite. As such, it provides
a powerful case study of how informal consociationalism, beyond the legal
structures of a constitution, can underpin the workings of a political system
from government formation through to resource allocation and the everyday
functions of the state. However, the way the Iraqi constitution was drafted
clearly indicates that it created an exclusive elite pact and as such exacerbated
feelings of resentment and alienation amongst key sections of Iraqi society
(Lindemann 2008).
The Iraqi experience of consociationalism echoes McCulloch and McEvoy’s
argument in this collection (McCulloch and McEvoy 2020) that the choices
made during the adoption of a power‐sharing arrangement impact on its later
performance and lifecycle. Moreover, and beyond the failings of the formal
constitutional process, the informal consociational system, through its
proportionality, has given rise to widespread and systematically sanctioned
corruption, which has alienated an even broader section of society from the
ruling elite and the system as a whole. Finally, this alienation and the protest
movement it has given rise to has driven a transformation in political
mobilization and identity politics beyond sectarianism, which consociationalism
would be hard pressed to explain. When faced with this protracted challenge to
their right to rule, Iraq’s ruling elite responded with an extended campaign of
violent suppression, putting the very survival of Iraq’s democracy into question.
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